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LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND ADAPTATION,
AND THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL SCIENCE COl:lHUNITY,';

Richard R. Nelson
Yale University

What kind of role can be played by the scientific commcnity in a
less developed co.untry in furthering the country's development ?

In this

paper I will try to develop a perspective on this question by describing the view
of underdevelop ment and the development process that tends to be held
by development economists and then contrasting the econ.omist ~ s view with
the one that tends to be held by the natural scientist.

The development

economist, by and large, has placed less 1-1eight on organized science as a
factor in development than has the natural scientist; while the economist
may underestima te the role of science in development , the natural science
community may overestimat e it.

In any case the reasons for the differences

are well worth exploring.
Section I will review the nature of the economic development problem
as viewed by many development economists.

I shall consider both the informal

theorizing based on relatively rich appreciatio n of facts and numbers
associated with the condition of "less developed", and the more formal theory,
*This paper has been changed in significant respects from the pre
conference version as a result of the education the author received at the
conference, and the suggestions of Yale colleagues Carlos Diaz-Alejan dro,
Robert Evenson, and Yoav Kislev.
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sharper but less rich, that has evolved in attempts t'e "explain " the anatomy
of underdev elopmen t.
I
The economi st s view of causatio n is striking ly differen t from that

which seems to charact erize the literatu re on science and technolo gy in
developm ent written by natural scientis ts and enginee rs.

To put it overly

simply, the economi st tends to view economic developm ent as a process of
ogy
"investm ent;" the natural scienti st· views the process as that of "technol
transfer " and "adapta tion".

It seems to me that both are half right.

will discuss these differen ces in Section II.

I

Section III will focus on the

role of the science communi ty in the less develope d countrie s, in the context
of the earlier discussi on of causatio n and process.

m1ile I coMe up with

more question s than answers , perh§:ps the question s are closer to the right
ones than those that have been posed by either the main line developm ent
economi sts or the natural scienti sts.

And posing the right question s

certainl y is an importa nt step towards getting the right answers.
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The Nature and Causes of Underdevelopment; The View of
the Development Economist

Almost all poor countries would be considered less developed (Japan
of a decade ago being a possible exception) and almost all less developed
countries are poor (but not Kuwait for example).

However, underdevelopment

clearly is a more complex phenomenon than simply low per capita income.
What are the characteristics associated with being underdeveloped?

What

explains the vast differences across nations in degree .of development?
How can development be initiated or accelerated?

This trio of related

questions has been the central concern of development economists, going
back as far as Adam Smith, and considerable research has been directed
toward them particularly over the past twenty years.

I think it fair to

say that we now know a good deal about the first question which involves
description, signifi:ccantly less about the second which requires specification
of causation, and still less about the third which requires in addition
knowledge about how to break into the causal system effectively and reliably.
In many ways the situation is similar to that in meteorology where a vast
amount is known about various complexes of weather conditions, there .is some
considerable knowledge of the "whys" behind what we observe and relatedly
some ability to predict weather, but very limited ability to deliberately in
fluence what the weather will be.
We understand the anatomy of underdevelopment in some considerable
detail.

1

We know for example that low per capita income tends to go with:

high percentage of the work force in agriculture, a large percentage of the
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small manufacturi ng sector in industries like textiles and food stuffs,
high birth and death rates, small amounts of physical capital per worker,
limited communicati ons systems, low literacy rates and levels of average
educational attainment, very few doctors per person.

The terms "large"

and "small" here of course are meant as comparision s with the situation in
"developed" countries as measured by per capita income.

If we look at the

development of countries over time the dynamic picture is consonant with the
cross section; as per capita income rises in a country so does the percent
of the work force in manufacturi ng, capital per worker, education, etc.
The relative importance ef a nation's scientific community clearly is
related to the level of develop!l,J.ent where$ following the definitions used
by UNESCO, the scientific community is meant to include engineers and
technicians of advanced training as well as scientists.

Less developed

countries are characteriz ed by a small fraction of scientists and engineers
in the work force compared with more developed countries, and very limited
R and D.

Further, the importance of the science coinmuni ty tends to grow

as the country develops over timeo

I mention these totally unstartling Jacts

because for some reason some people seem to have been impressed by them.

2

Many factors are associated with being less developed and change toward the levels
associated with the more developed countries as the country develops.
Whether the association between the level of development and the level of
science yields any guide to development policy and strategy would appear to
hinge on two question,

To what extent can the low level of science in the

11
less developed countries be consid2red as "caus al ra.thP.r than caused?

If causal, to what extent and at what cost can science and engineering in
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the less developed countries be effectively and reliably augmented or
enriched?
The economist's vie.;-1 of econor.i.ic causation traditionally has involved
two chains.

The first is that inputs cause or permit outputs, that output

generates income, that income generates demands for the use of resources.
The factors toward the end of the list above--particularly capital per worker
and the education of the work force--together with such exogenous variables
as the natural resource base, climate, etc" , have been treated as caus~l
with low productivity, low income, and consumption demand concentrated on
subsistence consumer goods, as the economic consequences.

The second

causal chain relates to the environment of international trade opportunities.
The allocation of economic inputs in a country is influenced not only by
demand patterns, but by comparative advantage which resides in industries
which employ inputs that are relatively plentiful and which require little
of the scarce inputs.
From this perspective science plays an ambiguous role.

It seems plausible

that the availability of scientists and engineers is a constraint on produc
tion, thus their linited quantity in the less developed countries mi~ht
be a factor "explair,

~

_;'' low average labor productivity and the pattern of

economic specialization.

But the exact way that scientists and en5;ineers

determine what can be produced is less clear than the way, say, machinery

or simple p~oduction skills or managerial ability limit production.

The

lack of clarity here is not just in the eyes of the development economist.
In only a few industries do business firP.J.s feel compelled to hire large
quantities of scientists and eng:L1eers without some kind of p;overnnent
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subsidy, particularly not in the less developed countries.

While the evidence

is clear on the importance of government support of applied Rand Din
such fields as defense and health, policy makers in all countries, rich
and poor, have been wrestling for some time with the question of what basic
research really does for the country.

·1hile public funds have usually been

1

forthcomin8 they have in large part been based on faith in practical payoff
rather than on hard evidence, and in part have been justified by science
as a value in itself rather than a neans to other values.

Thus the statement

that rich countries have more science because they can afford more science
may be as true as the statement that the rich countries are rich because
of their science.

The issue of principle direction of causation is in part

an empirical question, but it cannot be answered simply by seeing what goes
with what.

Rather a real causal theory is needed which generates a variety

of implications which can be tested.
It is important to stress that, unlike understanding of the anatomy
of underdevelopment where most development economists see eye to eye, and
unlike broad qualitative description of causation where there is considerable
agreement, there is no consensus among development economists about the
formal quantitative tueory linking "causes" to "effects".

lfuch of the formal

theoretical literature consists of a collection of often ingenious and provoca~
tive, but partial and usually mutually inconsistent, sub-theories.

However

there does exist one body of formal theory of relatively global scope that
many economists, perhaps the majority, take seriously and which seems
worthwhile to discuss here.

I shall call this theory, for short, the neo

classical theory of production and distribution.

The theory has two

separable components.
production function.

The first is the hypothesis of a cross country
The second is the hypothesis of competitive market

3
·
J. rium.
equi·1·b

The production function hypothesis is that differences in output per
worker between, say, Colombia, Japan, and the United States are the result
of differences in factors like machinery per worker and educational levels
in the quite explicit sense that if the United States had the same quan
tities of these factors as Colombia (or Japan) her labor productivity
would be the same, and if Colombia (or Japan) had the factor endowment of
the United States her labor productivity would be equal to that of the
United States.

As we look across countries at the different levels of

productivity and associated inputs, we really are observing different
points on the same function relating productivity to inputs--to use the
economist's jargon--all economies are on the same "production function".
It is apparent that, depending on the restrictions one places on the nature
of the production function, the hypothesis can either be empty in the sense
of not really being falsifiable, or quite powerful in that there are many
ways to refute it.

If few restrictions are put on the '¼lnmber of factors"

used to explain productivity differences, or on the "shape" of the function,
since the number of observations is finite, with enough ingenuity one can
"explain" as closely as one chooses.

On the other hand if one places some

quite stringent restrictions on the number of admissable factors limiting
them to, say, physical capital per worker and educational attainments, and
imposes some strong restrictions on the shape of the function, say continuous
and concave, then if much of the international productivity differences

-
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can be explained by the theory, one really has "explained" something.
There have been a number of empirical studies dedicated to testing this
hypothesis by statistical regression techniques.

Output for the economy

as a whole, or for particular sectors or industries is regressed against
various sets of inputs.

A variety of functional forms have been assumed.

Not suprisingly the goodness of fit of the looser jointed studies has been
significantly better than the goodness of fit of the studies where severe
restrictions were placed on the hypothesis.
Much more interesting are the empirical studies which have incorporated
the second component of the nee-classical hypothesis.

The market equilibrium

hypothesis ~EL that the constellation of inputs and outputs observed in a
country are consistent with the equilibrium conditions generated or inforced
by competition.

This means that the observed payments to the different

factors of production can be interpreted as !!leasures of their marginal
productivity (partial derivatives).

Depending on how one looks at it, this

hypothesis provides a way to estimate the slope of the production function
at different points without doing statistical regression, or some r;ather
strong constraints on the shape.
There is a considerable body of literature attempting, within the
framework of this theory, to relate cross country differences in value
4
added per worker to differences in the physical capital-labor ratio.
One version of the theory postulates that output per worker, Q/L, is a
differentiable, increasing and concave functien of the capital-labor ratio,
K/L, holding other factors constant, as illustrated by Figure 1.
consider the following data on Colombia and the United States.

5
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1964 value added per worker in Colombian manufacturing industry was about
$3,000 and the capital-labor ratio was about $6,000.
on the function.

This provides a point

The rate of return on capital averaged about 25%.

This provides a measure of the slope of the function at that point under
the '-'marginal. productivity" hypothesis.
United States was about $24,000.

The capital-labor ratio~•in the

Since a concave function must lie under

any of its tangent lines, multiplying $18,000 ($24,000 - $6,000) by .25
yields an overestimate of how much greater Colombia's output per worker
would be at U.S. capital-labor ratio.

$7,500 thus is an upper bound on

what output per worker in Colombia would be if the assumptions of the theory
hold, Colombia's capital stock per worker were augmented to equal that in
the United States, and no other differentiating characteristic (like educa
tional attainment) change.

Since U.S. value added per worker is about $12,000,

differences in the capital-labor ratio are only part of the story.
The assumed concavity of the production function means that the linear
approximation above is an over.estimate, not an "estimate".

Economists

long have been attracted to a specific form of the production function
that builds in concay::.ty--a function that specifies output per worker as
a log linear function in capital per worker.

Under these assumptions and

given the numbers it can be shovm that a quadrupling of the capital-labor
ratio (which would bring Colombia in line with the United States) would
double productivity, a significantly smaller impact than the "overestimate"
developed above (see Figure 1).

For a variety of reasons some economists believe

that the log linear form (in the economics literature called a Cobb-Douglas
form) underestimates the concavity of the production function.

In some
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of the more recent studies economists have shown a preference for a form
with considerable concavity implying that differences in the capital-labor
ratio explain only about half of the difference that is implied by the use
of a Cobb-Douglas form.
One can attempt to estimate the effect upon productivity of the lower
educational attainments of the less developed countries in the same manner. 6
About 30% of the work force in Colombian manufacturing industry had a
secondary school education or better compared with 80% in the United States.
Only 3% had attended some college compared with about 20% in the United
States.

It is possible to get rough figures on the average earnings of

Colombian workers of different levels of educational attainment:
suprisingly the higher the education the higher the earnings.

not

If one assumes

th:at these earnings reflect marginal productivity one can make an "overestimate"

of the effect of the differences in educational attainment on productivity.
The results are roughly similar in quantitative impact to those for
physical capital.

Under the assu~ptions of the theory differences in the

educational distribution explain less than 1/2 of the productivity differ
ences.

How much le~s than 1/2 depends on what one assumes about the curvature

of the function.

Again, as with physical capital, :i'f one assumes:a log

linear form the answer is significantly less.
An interesting question is, are the bvo calculations additive?

answer is yes for both the linear and the log linear calculations.
sum

The
The

of the linear extrapolations is an overestimate of the effect of

bringing both physical capital per worl:er and educational standards to
U.S. level.

The sum of the two "log linear" calculations gives the con-
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sequences of changing both factors to U.S. levels if the production function
was in fact log linear in both of those factors.

The upshot is that togither

these two factors cannot explain all of the observed productivity differences,
although they may be able to explain a considerable portion.
I have discussed these kinds of calculations in some detail to familarize
the non-economist with the existing mainline theory in economics and to
point out that a significant portion of international differences in develop
ment levels can be explained by factors that have little to do directly
with differences in science and technology.

There are a number of basic

difficulties with the theory sketched above that I will not go into here.
Some of these will be discussed in the context of comparison of the
"neo-classical" theory with the "technology gap" theory, to which I now turn.
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The Processes of Economic Development:

Investment

and Technology Transfer

The restiveness that many natural scientists and engineers (and
many economists, including myself) feel when they try to reconcile their
perception of the anatomy of underdevelopment with the neo-classical theory
can best be brought into focus by considering the process of development
implicit in that theory.

The neo-classical theory views the process of

development in terms of increases in the various factors that comple1:1ent
labor, raise its productivity, and which chan3e the pattern of demand and
comparative advantage.

Host of these factor$ are expanded by the deliberate

use of res:ources for that purpose--labor, materials, and capital to build
new machines, teachers, school buildings to extend education.

can be viewed as the result of investment of various types.

Thus development
Just as cross

country differences in output and inputs are interpreted as different
points along a production function, grovth is viewed as movement along it.
There exists a substantial body of literature on growth of the developed
countries, particularly the United States, within this framework.

The

studies of the less developed countries done within this framework have
been able to account for most of growth by increases in the capital stock
and education, with some interesting exceptions like Taiwan, Israel, and Japan.
This description of the "process" of developnent, whatever its merits
in terms of statistical fit, seems inadequate or misleading to observers of
less developed countries who have been irrpressed by the vast differences
in technological capabilities.

The discussion of "process" seems to highlight

that differences in aggregative measures of capital stock and educational

7
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attainments somehow do not capture fully the apparent lack of capability
in less developed countries to set up and operate an electronics products
factory, run a railroad, keep the telephone system goin~, deal with epidemics.
Expansion of capital and education fails to characterize adequately all
that is needed to acquire these capabilities.

Part of the difficulty

with the neo-classical theory may be that in the forI!l abot-e it is too
aggregative; it represses the iBportance of scientific and technical skills
by lumping then under education and capital.

But I think there is More

to it than that; the implicit dynaI!lics do not rinP, ri~ht.
the problem boils down to two sets of questions.

In

fJ'f

judgment

First, is there something

involved in "chanr;inr;" the way an economy operates that transcends the
difference between the equilibrium characterizations of the initial and
terminal positions?

Second, is there somethin~ about a nation's scientific

community that is particularly important in the chan~e process?

I believe

the answer is yes to both of these questions.
Before considering the poor countries and their development it is
useful to refer briefly to a debate that has been foinf:s on amonl", economists
about economic growth in advanced countries, particularly the United States.
The issue is the relative importance of, and analytic treatment of, tech
nological change in the zrowth process.

As suc:~ested above there is a school

of analysis that is attemptinp.; to account fully for f,:rowth within the neo
classical theory.

Research and development is visualized as a form of

investment: that enhances the quality or productivity of other innuts.

8

Other people have argued that this vie,, represses the dynamics of the process
and thereby obscures rather than clarifies.

Thus in the nee-classical
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view the returns to education are determined by the relative availability
of complementary inputs such as unskilled.labor and capital.

This obscures

that highly educated people in research and development r:ia.na~ement and
production are largely involved in creating new technology, making decisions
regarding its merit, finding out how to use it effectively, Retting the
bugs out, and routinizing its operation so that people with lesser training
can operate it.

Once the new technology is created, selected, put in place,

and has become familiar, the advantages of scientific and technical expertise
is greatly reduced.

Or consider the conditions under which there are hip;h

returns to new investnent.
of other factors.

The neo-classical view stresses the availability

The "technical change" view stresses the availability

of unexploited investment opportunities larqely due to the creation of new
technological opportunities.

Put another way, in the nee-classical view

changes in the factors of production are seen as permittin~ the econony
to sustain different points along a fixed production function.

In the

technical change view certain factors are seen as generating new attainable
points and enabling the economy to move along an evolving production function.
Several of the recent studies in effect brush this distinction under
the rug.

In these studies a considerable portion of p;rowth is accounted

for by improvements in the quality of capital and increases in the supply
of persons with high levels of education.

The implication sone have drawn

is that technical c hc[lge has been nuch less inportant than thought earlier.
This may be very nisleading.

The improvements in the quality of capital

themselves are probably in good part the result of new technolo~y.

The

high rer:iuneration to educated persons that give large explanatory weir:ht
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to their augmentation is, if the technical chani;e view is correct, intimately
connected with their contribution to the creation and implementation of
new technology.

If the pace of technical change had been slower we would

have experienced neither the observed large increases in capital quality
nor the maintenance of high returns to educated people in the face of
their relative growth.
While this discussion might not appear to have much connection with
the processes of development in poor countries where the creation of new
technology is not central in the process it does have a cor.aection.

The

link can be seen by considerin~ recent findings on the pattern of international
trade in manufactured products and the li~ht these findinp,s shed on the
pattern of comparative advantage in the less developed countries.

Recent

research has shm-m that a very large proportion of U. S, nanufacturing exports
are in new products that other countries have not yet begun to produce in
quantity.

Uith a la8 other manufacturing nations pick up and employ

U.S. technology and gradually cut the United States out of export markets.
With a greater lag eventually less developed countries ber,in to adopt and
employ the technology if it has not already becone obsolete.

This pattern

is not easily explained by the implications of the neo-classical theory
viewed as a theory of comparative advanta~e.

It is consistent with the

technical change view of the economic growth process. 9
The theory of technological lead and product cycle sup;gests a quite
different analysis of international differences in productivity than is
implied by the neo-classical theory discussed in the preceedinp; section.
The technological lead of the United States (with occasional competition
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from a few other countries) must be recognized explicitly.

The U.S. lead

can, at least partially, be attributed to its "endowments" of managers,
scientists, engineers and just plain innovative and flexible people.

Hore

generally, the position of any country in the diffusion hierarchy may well
be a function of factor endowments, particularly supply of sophisticated
managers, technicians, and easily trainable labor.

But there is no reason

to believe that these factors enter in a way that one would try to force
them to enter in analysis if one followed the traditional nee-classical
approach.

For viewing the economic development process as a diffusion

process naturally leads one to abandon the two basic assumptions of the
nee-classical model--that all countries are on the same production function,
and that markets are im equilibrium and competitive such that the returns
to particular factors reflect their marginal productivity in the traditional
sense.
This point of view also suggests a quite different perspective on
the nature of the development process in poor countries.

In the neo-classical

theory there is a snese in which the less developed countries are adopting
the technology of the rich, but the sense is that of two people walking
down the same path because it is the only path.

The "diffusion of technology"

view sees the rich countries follm-,ed by the poor countries because the
former is providing the technology and the model for development.
is a much more active view of technology adoption or transfer.

This

And it

calls attention to a variety of ~echnaisms repressed in the nee-classical
theory.
As I indicated above there has been far less adherence to the neo-
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classical theory among economists studying the less developed countries than
among those studying advanced ones.

Among the variety of partial models

of development alluded to earlier are many that view development of the
less developed countries as a process of structural transformation transcending
simple gowth of capital and labor.

Some of the early (post war) development

models focused on the fact (in most less developed countries) of significantly
higher average labor productivity in manufacturing than in agriculture and
viewed the shifting of labor towards manufacturing, constrained by the rate
of capital formation, as the heart of the develoPme~t process.

10

It now

is apparent that this view masks the vast differences in productivity
levels among both manufacturing business firms and farms.

The structural shift

.view of development seems correct bµt would appear to involve a much more
general switch over from traditional technologies to modern both in manu
facturing and in agriculture.
As

the product cycle view of international trade indicates, to a con

siderable extent the more modern manufacturing technolo3y being adopted
by the less developed countries is dire~tly or indirectly imported from

the advanced countries.

The manufacturing development process appears to

be characterized by intra-sector dualism.

11

Hhile rapid industrialization

in many (but not all) of today's less developed countries began only in
the post-World Har II period, this did not mean that they started with no
manufacturing sector at all.

Rather if the few countries that have been

studied from this point of view be a guide, they long have had a quite
diversified manufacturing sector providing a variety of goods for domestic
consumption using traditional technologies, sometimes augmented with some
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more modern power equipment.

In addition there often were a few modern

firms or sub-industries , often foreign owned, and often producing goods
for export.

The wave of post-Har industrializati on has been superimposed

upon this traditional structure of craft industry.

Today in many of the less

developed countries one can identify two roughly separable grGups of firms.
One group, generally newcomers or a few old firms that have transformed
themselves, consists of firms that are roughly similar to typical firms in
the same industry in the nore developed countries--some what smaller, with
somewhat lower value- added per worker, capital per worker, and labor
quality--but using roughly the same kind of technology and recognizable
as the same kind of animal.

The other 8roup is conprised of the traditional

small craft firms using significantly less in the way of modern equipment,
quite different (and less related to formal education) skills, and creating
a far lower value added per worker.

To a considerable extent these two

groups of firms differ in terms of their products.

Within the so called

metal products industry the craft firms produce pots and pans, the more
modern firms produce parts for, say, washing machines and refrigerators.
in many cases there is more direct competition.

But

Craft firms produce shoes

and furniture largely by hand or with simple power tools, modern firms
produce competitive products using much more power equipment and mass
production organization.
As develoPmant proceeds the modern sector will expand relative to the
traditional and improve its efficiency.

The pace at which this will happen

will depend in part upon the resources that the society invests in new
plant and equipment and in creatinp; the relevant skills.

But it w-ill
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depend as well on the more complex structure of incentives, constraints,
and mechanisms that encourage and facilitate the entry of new firms using
modern technology, the adoption of better technology by older firms, and
more generally the expansion and improvement of the modern sub-sector.
Part of this structure involves the capabilities of the mechanisms for
interjecting in the right places and spreading the relevant technological
knowledge.

I take it that these are the mechanisms that 8ive operational

meaning to the concept of "technology transfer".
In many less developed countries one 1.d>serves the same kind of dualism
in agriculture as one sees in manufa-,.,cturing, and in many countries the
agricultural development process seems characterized by the same expansion
of new modern entities and attrition of old that marks manufacturing
development.

However it appears that in agriculture, modernization of old

farms as contrasted uith entry of new is more important than in manufacturing.
Perhaps relatedly in at least a few countries the kind of dualism experienced
in manufacturing development has not characterized agricultural development
which rather has been marked by the roughly in pace improvement in efficiency
of most (or at least many) farms.
Further, unlike in manufacturing agricultural development has been
marked by a number of disappointments when a strategy of simple "technology
transfer" has been adopted--the attempt to increase productivity by replacing
traditional methods with those used in developed countries.

Success often has

required considerably more modification and special tailoring of technology
than has usually been required in manufacturins.

Clearly agricultural

development is neither a simple investment process, nor usually is simple
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technology transfer mechanisms a sufficient complement.

Rather, it appears

to require organization and effort to develop the right kin~s of new tech
nology.

I take it that these mechanisms give operational meaning to the

coneept of "technology adaptation".
The mechanisms of technology transfer and adaptation are complex
involving many different kinds of inputs, relationships, and institutions.
Important among these are those that involve the national and international
science community.

It is in its contribution to makin~ these mechanisms

work more effectively that the developmental role of the national science
community can be sought.
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The Role of National Science Policy

Earlier I posed the question; to what extent can the low level of
science in the less developed countries be considered causal?

There

certainly are apparent causal links that run from availability and
activity of scientific and technical personnel to the pace and character
of economic developemtn.

It is not clear, however, if the return to putting

resources into augmenting scientific capabilities is high relative to other
forms of investment.

This of course hinges on the second question that

I posed; to what extent and at what cost is it possible reliably to expand
and enrich a nation's scientific and technical capabilities?
It seems important at the outset to set down some points 6f aq,reenent
between those that take a strong "nee-classical" position and those that
take a strong "science is important" position.

One is the importance

of improving and expanding the educational system in less developed
countries, and rapidly and greatly increasing the educational attainments
of the population.

I presume that all uould agree that scientific and .

technical education should play an important role in this general educational
enhancement.

I think all would agree that at least a few people are

needed with very high levels of training, and that many with moderately
high levels of training are needed in industry, agriculture, public
utilities, to operate the weather forecasting system, undertake resource
surveys, etc., as ,Jell as in the educational system itself.

However there

may be some strong differences regarding the relative emphasis upon science
versus other fields, and on the 0 alance that should be struck between
achieving widespread middle level competence versus educating a few to the
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highest levels.

I shall return to these issues shortly.

Economists have been prone to make a sharp conceptual split between
routine operation and innovation.

Particularly where people with strong

scientific and technical training are involved in operation the split in
fact is not all that clear; the evidence is clear that a lot of innovation
comes from wrestling with ways to improve performance and solve prople.ms
on the job and not in a separate research and development operation.
However conscious research and development efforts are a major source
of innovation in many fields.

To what extent and in what areas is R and D

important for the less developed countries?

A second area of general

agreement would appear to be the high value of a national Rand D effort
in agriculture and health.

As auggested earlier soil type, temperature,

rainfall conditions, the insect and pest population, etc., tend to be unique
to the country and the sub-area in question, hence seeds, fertilizers,
and practices that go well in one place (particularly the developed countries)
may be ill adopted to another.

Experience suggests that better technologies

are possible and need to be specifically developed and tested on site.
Experience also suggests that agricultural research and development
needs to be complemented by education of farmers to prepare them to be
able to assess and use the new technology, and extention to provide detailed
knowledge and assistance.

And the new agricultural scientists, extention

agents, and teachers need to be taught as well as the farmers.

Experience

in the United States and elsewhere also suggests that the broad field of
agricultural experimentation proceeds best when the applied work interacts
with basic work in various fields of the life sciences, chemistry, ecology,
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agricultural economics and sociology, etc.

That the package of research,

extension, and education typically recommended by U.S. agricultural scientists
is roughly that of land grant structure in the United States suggests that
there may be some rationalization in the argument; nonetheless the package
seems pcssible to put together and while the costs are not inconsiderable
a case can be made that the returns are likely to be high.

Very similar

kinds of arguments appear germane in the fields of health and medicine.
The special characteristics of the national and local environment seem
to call for a national program of medical schools, institutions for training
other kinds of health personnel, applied research, and the basic science
support base.
These qualitative arguments based partly on ad hoc theorizing and in
part on experience suggest that some of a nation's development efforts
should be put in these activities.

They do not answer quantitative questions

like how much of a country's efforts should be put into agriculture and
health versus manufacturing and other sectors.

Nor do they answer within

the agricultural and health programs of a nation how much should be allocated
to building up scientific and educational capabilities in these fields
as contrasted with efforts in irrigation, purchasing machinery> buying
fertilizer> allocating trained medical personnel for dealing with present

health problems with known methods versus research and teaching
:,

'

within the science package, how· much applied and how much basic.
also pose questions of organizational policy.

etc., or,
They

I do not have any ideas

on these questions I wish to discuss here.
The questions I would like at least to pose are first, do these arguments
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provide support for a policy of strongly encouraging the development of
a significant basic research community.
The bulk of the applied research and development in the technically
advanced countries is not in agriculture or health but in manufacturing
industry.

However, unlike agriculture and medicine, technology developed

in the advanced countries apparently -~an be applied with only modest
modification in a less developed country, and in fact is being applied.
While the special circumstances of the local environment--in particular
small scale of operation, nuances of local materials, the high cost of
capital, lack of skills in the work force, low wage rates for overabundant
unskilled labor--makes technology modification desirable, in manufacturing,
imported technology is at least viable and generally very profitable.
Further in manufacturing industry, in the advanced countries, there
is a reasonably well worked out private system of technological commu
nication and assi-stance that has obviated the need for an industrial
analogue of the agricultural extension service, and such a system already is
growing up in the less developed countries.

These mechanisms include

direct investment by foreign companies, patent licensing, privately ne
gotiated consultative arrangements, technical assistance from suppliers
of machinery and materials, sending young engineers and mana~ers abroad
for training and experience.

To a considerable extent the lack of need

for adaptive R and D and existence of private mechanisms of technology
transfer would appear to reduce the need for national investment in in
dustrial research and development, and technical information services.
Further, a case can be made that if such investments are important they
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will be profitable and naturally forthcoming through private aegis.
Of course that profit can be made without modifying technology is

no argument that there aren't positive net benefits from efforts at industrial
Rand D.

National governments and internation al agencies often have seen

it worthwhile to establish in the less developed countries industrial
Rand D facilities, productivit y centers, etc.

To my knowledge however,

we have very little useful evidence on the performance of those that have
been in operation.

The many laudatory comments that one can read are

based largely on lists of "achievemen ts" with little or no effort to assess
their importance, and often on no more than that the organizatio n has
survived thus far.

Both the arguments and evidence for an active policy

of supporting the establishme nt of an industrial Rand D effort in a less
developed country continue to be sketchy.
One of the research tasks to which I would assign high priority
would be a detailed examination of industrial Rand Din the less developed
countries, both public and (where it exists) private.

As suP,gested above

many applied Rand D facilities have published lists of their accomplishm ents.
These of course need to be scrutinized , but more important their impact
needs to be evaluated.

The evaluation needs to consider the specific

economic benefits such as productivit y enhancement and cost reduction,
export yield, etc.

But more broadly it seems important to examine the

extent to which a national industrial research and development policy
and availabilit y of local engineers and applied scientists can reduce
dependence on foreign corporation for modem technology, the relative
effects of these two means upon employment, income of nationals, exports, ete.
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Here the Japanese case seems particularly worth examining in detail.
Also Hexico's and India's experience with public applied industrial Rand D.
The discussion above has viewed science as instrumental and rather
specific in its impact in that it is assumed that a ccmtry can opt for
a policy of scientific effort in support of agriculture, health, manufacturing
or other particular sectors or toward particular national goals.

There

is of course a considerable body of thought that argues that this perception
of the problem is narrow minded and short sighted.

It is argued that while

tbe sectoral philosophy occasionally pays lip service to basic research,
it does not recognize adequately the extent to ~hich both good applied research
and good science teaching require an environment of strong basic research.
The range of science fields that must be taught even to those that do applied
research in a narrow field is rather wide.

Further, higher education is

needed for technologists in almost all fields.

Thus the higher educational

capabilities of a nation require that basic research not be constrained
to those fields directly under the applied research effort.

Hore broadly,

it is argued that the "applied research" philosophy ne~lects the extent to
which the evolution of a national science community is an important
input to the changes in ~alues, perceptions, and skills of a nation's
population that are required for development, and ignores the fact that
the development of a nation's science community is an important end in
itself.
Since most sophisticated proponants of strong educational push with
"applied research" in selected fields philosophy accept the need for at
least some basic research particularly in areas where basic knowledge
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is inadequat e to the task, and see the developme nt of the nation's capabilit ies
for education in science and technolog y as an important objective , I
take it that the issue in question is whether a sizeable special effort
should be made to develop the scientifi c ®pabilit ies of a nation indepen
dently of any well if broadly defined needs for applied research and education .
Those that argue the positive side often propose that a scientist , or a
man with ,e-cnsidera ble training in science, is a superior general purpose
problem solver, and that the nation's need for him transcend s jobs that

one might normally define as scientifi c or technolog ical.
is true to some extent.

This possibly

But economis ts, lawyers, graduates of schools

of business administr ation, and other professio nals might counter that they
too have credentia ls as general purpose problem solvers.

Further, the

''general purpose problem solver" argument doesn't support the claim that

very advanced levels of scientifi c training are needed, and an associate d
strong program of support of basic research.
I find the arguments in favor of building up a strong basic researeh
capabilit y unpersuas ive.

The kinds of correlati ons between science and

GNP discussed earlier provide no support at all.

However I think we must

admit, or rather stress, that we know very little about the connectio n
between basic science in a less developed country and its economic
developme nt.

What evidence really is there that a strong national tasie

re.search effort is essential to good applied research and teaching?

It

is apparent that most industria l applied research and developme nt and mos.t
applied agricultu ral research and experime ntation proceeds with very
little contact with basic research and indeed with little input £Tom recent
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basic scien ce.

are
To what exten t do the kinds of appli ed resea rch that

ire signi gican t basic
impo rtant in less devel oped coun tries seem to requ
the engin eers and appli ed
Tesea1'Ch unde rpinn ings? We know that the bulk of
not train ed in scho ols
agric ultur al techn ician s in the Unite d State s were
a train ing in basic
noted for their stron g basic resea rch. How stron g
devel opme nt perso nnel
scien ce reall y is requi red for appli ed resea rch and
what level of scien tific
in the less devel oped coun tries? How impo rtant is
littl e, if any, resea rch
educ ation in entre prene urshi p? To my know ledge very
even have a detai led
has been done on these ques tions . I do not think we
lly doing in the less
accou nting of what scien tists and engin eers are actua
o and Israe l would be
devel oped coun tries . Here I think Japan , India , Mexic
parti cula rly rewa rding studi es.
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